In the USA, the public sector historically was the primary supplier of new agricultural technologies. But over the past 20-30 years, public agricultural research funding has been relatively stagnant while private sector research spending has surpassed it. At the same time, as the US policy environment has changed, patenting and licensing have become increasingly important mechanisms for technology transfer from the public sector. We review these policy changes and provide an empirical example of public sector patenting in agricultural biotechnology. Patenting by the US federal government has been relatively limited and concentrated in a few areas of technology. On the other hand, agricultural biotechnology patenting by US universities has expanded rapidly and has covered a broader spectrum of technologies.
Introduction
Research and technology development have been the foundation of impressive productivity gains in the agricultural sector. Historically, the public sector was the primary supporter and conductor of agricultural research, and the primary supplier of new technologies. In recent years, the private sector has become a major contributor to the development of new agricultural technologies. In the USA, private sector spending for food and agricultural research now exceeds agricultural research expenditures by the public sector (Fuglie et al., 1996) . Public sector R&D funds have been relatively stagnant for the last 20 years. Because of its past reliance on public research, an active private sector, and its science-based nature, the agricultural sector makes a useful case study for technology transfer policy.
While public sector research has experienced minimal funding increases, the demands on the public system have grown increasingly complex as food consumption increases and the desire for environmental amenities and food safety grows. World food production must increase in order to adequately feed future generations. At the same time, income is also increasing in much of the world. This, too, will raise the global demand for agricultural products. Growing concerns for the environment, associated with more affluent societies, have also expanded the priorities for agriculture. The desire is for technologies that have the potential not only to increase farm productivity but also to reduce the environmental and resource costs sometimes associated with agricultural production. This type of innovation is generally associated with public research and development. Another expectation of the public system is the creation of agricultural processes and products with improved qualities. For certain key qualities, such as improved food safety, private incentives for development are limited. For example, microbial contamination (or the lack thereof) is not a quality easily perceived by consumers. Other adulterants may be even more difficult to detect. Because industry will retain few financial returns from innovations that improve food safety, the public sector remains the primary source for new technologies with these benefits.
Thus, the combination of increased demands on the system and stagnant resources has led research administrators to explore alternatives to the traditional public research model. Public research institutions have sought to make use of the growing capacity of private research institutions, both as a means of compensating for limited funds and as an avenue for promoting socially desirable technology. Changes in the policy environment for technology transfer have led to increasing public sector patenting and licensing as one mechanism for transferring technology from the public to the private sector. This paper outlines the structure of US agricultural research, notes potential strengths and weaknesses of technology transfer through patenting and licensing, and discusses various features of the changing technology transfer environment. As an empirical example, patent data for agricultural biotechnology are analysed. Patents are only one of a variety of measures available to gauge technology transfer, but they have become an increasingly important feature of agricultural biotechnology. Agricultural biotechnology stands out as a technological area in which science is changing rapidly, the private sector has invested heavily, and the use of patents has become particularly important.
In the USA, the public sector has a long history of close collaboration with private agricultural industries, in part because public agricultural research is often more applied in nature than other types of public research (Fuglie et al., 1996) . Public agricultural research involves a unique partnership between the federal government (chiefly the US Department of Agriculture) and the States, through the Land Grand University System. Land Grant Universities provide a base for the State Agricultural Experiment Stations, and many scientists have joint federal-state appointments with the university and the experiment station. USDA and the State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) together conduct around $3 billion of research (see Figure 1 ). In 1998, USDA conducted about $790 million worth of research in-house through its research agencies, primarily the Agricultural Research Service. The SAES and cooperating institutions conducted about $2.4 billion worth of research, making them the largest performer of research in the public sector. USDA paid for about $1.5 billion of total public research, and the States a little over $1 billion, with additional funds supplied by the private sector.
Technology transfer policy
Several goals have been stated for technology transfer policy. The first is to bring the benefits of public R&D to potential users. One of the motivating factors behind changes in US technology transfer policy was concern that too many publicly developed technologies were useful, but unused. One policy option was to offer firms exclusive rights to technologies, thus justifying the resources needed for commercialisation (Winebrake, 1992) .
In an era of scarce resources, research institutions are seeking innovative ways to meet their targets (Fuglie et al., 1996) . The second informal goal is to draw on private sector resources when possible, as the public sector shifts resources to areas in which it has a comparative advantage. Many public agricultural research institutions have sought to pass more applied work onto the private sector, and focus instead on basic research and applied research with strong public good characteristics. Technology transfer has offered public research institutions an opportunity to allow private firms to assume certain forms of applied research and development.
A third reason for technology transfer is that it may allow public institutions to influence the development of new technologies. The private sector is now the primary supplier of new agricultural technologies (Fuglie et al., 1996) . Like other industries, agricultural production offers benefits to society, but it may also impose certain externalities. Technology transfer offers public institutions an opportunity to promote the development of technologies that increase agriculture's benefits to society, or mitigate the costs of agricultural production.
Finally, a fourth goal related to technology transfer is possible. Certain institutions seek to use technology transfer, particularly the pursuit of intellectual property rights such as patents, for the purpose of selling inventions (or rights to inventions) to raise revenue. This differs from the second goal, as it is not merely apportioning certain R&D to the private sector, but rather protecting an invention for the purpose of gaining research funds. Thus, a patent can offer a public institution the chance to maximise the institution's return from innovation similar to the way it is done by private firms (Huffman and Evenson, 2006) .
Similarities and differences in university and federal government technology transfer
All four of these technology transfer goals may apply both within agricultural research and in other fields of research. They could also apply to both universities and federal research laboratories, but there are likely differences as well. Universities have another major function, education, which the federal government does not have. For much of their history, US universities emphasised engineering and applied technology development more than they did basic research (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994) . Following World War II, US universities became one of the world's most important sources of public-good research, a role consistent with the 'market failure' paradigm. In this paradigm, public investments in research and development (R&D) are a response to market failure, in which public R&D generates scientific knowledge, which has many characteristics of a public good and is thus under-provided by markets. On the other hand, the 'mission technology' paradigm applies more readily to federal laboratories. This paradigm 'assumes that the government should perform R&D in service of well-specified missions in which there is a national interest not easily served by private R&D' (Bozeman, 2000) . To the extent that these paradigms adequately describe research by universities and the federal government, it is possible that the areas of science pursued by the government are somewhat more circumscribed than those addressed by universities. As a result, the federal government might be expected to focus more on technology transfer in specific areas than do universities.
Possible benefits from patent licensing
One of the first benefits from patent licensing is simply a by-product of the patent process: clear communication of the benefits of public research results from the patent disclosure process. The specifications of the invention are available to anyone in a detailed, uniform format. While the invention itself is protected, the information embodied in the description of the technology may have value for others in research and development. The awarding of a patent also demonstrates that the invention met the criteria for patents, in other words the technology was new, useful, and non-obvious. Thus, patents demonstrate that the institution has produced work that is original and that has one or more useful applications. By offering exclusivity though patent licensing, public institutions may be able to increase the overall returns from the development of new technologies (Winebrake, 1992) . The technology protected by a patent often represents many years of research. Ideally, that research will be used in as many ways as possible, including improvements to existing technologies used in the production process. However, the marketing of technologies is not within the mission of public research institutions. To induce private firms to adopt, develop, and market technologies, firms may need assurance that their investments in R&D, production, and marketing can be captured. If another firm can 'free ride' on the marketing and production work of the original developer, the incentives to invest funds for commercialisation are reduced. By offering exclusivity, government laboratories and universities may increase research returns through greater use of their inventions.
Public sector patent and licensing may reduce the risks associated with commercialising new technologies. While the risks of commercialisation may be reduced by exclusivity, they are also reduced by upstream research performed by public sector scientists. Licensees know that the technology has been thoroughly reviewed, patented, and is backed by the resources of the public institution. The development of new technologies may involve many false leads, and require considerable trial and error before a 'successful' technology is found. If a technology is near the end stages of development, its properties are defined and generally can be demonstrated, thus the risks are significantly less for the developer than they would be starting at an earlier stage in the development process.
Licensing may result in the adoption of socially desirable technologies that would not have been commercialised otherwise. Social benefits, such as food safety or improved environmental quality, rarely have marketable value. Thus, a new technology with reduced impact on the environment could be used to produce a product with the same market value as an equally productive technology with greater negative impacts. However, the value to society of use of the new technology would be greater. These societal values motivate public institutions to develop such technologies, and to foster their adoption. Even if the new technology was believed to be profitable, though, a company must invest resources to develop and produce the technology. A patent licensing programme, through the aforementioned benefits of exclusivity and risk reduction, can make such beneficial technologies more attractive for commercialisation. Rubenstein (2003) reviewed the U.S. Department of Agriculture's patent and licensing programme, addressing social benefits associated with disseminated technologies. The technologies licensed were examined for four potential social benefits: food safety, nutrition, human health, and environmental or natural resource protection. Over half of the licensed patents had one or more of these social benefits. For example, within innovations dealing with plant protection, biological pest control dominated the set of technologies, accounting for 21 of 44 licenses. Biological controls offer pest management that may be more environmentally benign than traditional, chemical pesticides, thus has strong public good characteristics.
Finally, private entities may face pressure from regular contractors for preferential treatment. They may also be unwilling to license to competitors, or the competitors of 111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  1011  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  2011  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  30  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  40  1  2  3  4  5  6  711  8 firms with which they cooperate. These factors underlie a related concept called 'defensive patenting', in which public institutions patent an invention in order to keep it in the public domain. Defensive or preemptive patenting may prevent 'hold-ups' in the research process that could be created by firms wishing to retain control of inventions needed in the research process by others. If a public institution holds a patent, it can license as many uses of its invention as are needed to maximise the innovation process. The degree of 'hold-ups' from companies refusing to license research tools is uncertain, but theoretically, the incentive exists (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).
Common concerns about technology transfer and patent licensing
Some economists and other observers object to public sector patenting on theoretical grounds. Jaffe and Lerner (2001) present a brief review of the literature that states that private intellectual property ownership is more efficient than public ownership, mainly due to greater flexibility in the private sector, as well as to more pronounced incentives for private managers. These arguments assume something of a dichotomy. That is, intellectual property can be held by public or private institutions, and a choice between the two should be made. Furthermore, Cohen and Noll (1996) observe that shielding innovations can preclude beneficial users. However, much of the basis of technology transfer policy is that insufficient private incentives exist for firms to carry out or commercialise the kind of research done by public institutions. Thus, this section's focus will be on specific criticisms of technology transfer and patent licensing programmes rather than to more theoretical objections.
A key concern is that public institutions will conduct R&D that would have been conducted by the private sector in any case (National Research Council, 1995) . If market incentives will guide a firm to undertake certain research and technology development, there is no need to use scarce public sector resources. Public scientists and research administrators are supposed to determine whether any of their research and technology development would be sufficiently interesting to the private sector that they will conduct it in the absence of public effort. Making this determination can be difficult, particularly as it may involve incremental decisions, such as whether the private sector would assume responsibility at specific stages of a line of research or for certain applications of existing work. Such decision making can require detailed knowledge of both the science and the industries that potentially could be involved.
Another concern is that patenting activity will not be sufficiently focused on R&D that promotes public goods. As noted before, the public agricultural research system has a long history of geographically specific applied research. Thus, the public sector was the primary source of many different types of agricultural technologies. However, the structure of US agricultural research has changed significantly. The dramatic growth of the private sector has allowed public institutions to focus on research of greatest interest to society as a whole (that is, with the greatest public goods). However, determining what is most clearly in the public good can be difficult, particularly for institutions with well-established programmes of applied research and strong interested constituencies.
A third concern is that increasing revenues through licensing will become the primary goal of patenting, rather than technology transfer. Thursby et al. (2001) income generated by Technology Transfer Offices was seen as the most important measure of their success. Despite the fact that such funds account for a relatively small percentage of public agricultural research funds, resources from these sources have increased over time (Current Research Information System, various years). In an era of stagnant funds, any area with the potential for growth is of interest to research administrators and could possibly influence research prioritisation. There also exists the possibility that returns to individual inventors could influence decisions at the bench scientist's level. Many public institutions grant inventors a portion of the licensing proceeds. Thus, individual scientists may be motivated by income from patenting and licensing, even if the employing institution is not. One limit to the concern about individual inventors is Bozeman's (2000) observation that the reward systems at universities and government laboratories such as USDA's are based largely on scientific publications, rather than commercial activity.
A fourth concern is that the licensing process may favour certain types of institutions, or particular firms. Cohen and Noll (1996) state that exclusive licenses can place nonparticipating competing firms at a disadvantage, sometimes by their own choice, but sometimes as a result of competitors' requests for exclusivity. The selection process varies from institution to institution. However, confidential business information is often provided as part of a licensing application. Because such information cannot be shared with the public, transparency in the selection process may be limited.
The underlying theme in all these concerns is that the patenting and licensing process will somehow shift public sector research priorities towards those of the private sector. If public sector researchers were to reorient their given research missions to attract private sector partners, conduct research that was not necessary, or select less than optimal cooperators, the mix of research priorities and transfer activities would be less than socially optimal.
The changing environment for technology transfer

US legislation and research incentives
There was widespread concern during the 1970s and 1980s about both the declining rate of productivity growth in the US economy and the loss of international competitiveness among US companies. Some believed that constraints to the transfer of technology between the public and private sectors were in large part responsible for this situation. Traditional methods of transferring technology to firms (publications, education and training, consultancies, and personnel exchanges) were viewed as inadequate; research innovations were not being commercialised quickly enough, if at all. The result was legislation easing the transfer of new technology between public research institutions and the private sector (Congressional Research Service, 1991) .
Since 1980, various pieces of federal legislation have been enacted designed to foster the transfer of technology from the public sector to the private sector. As a matter of policy, the US government forbids federal research that competes in any way with the private sector. Until 1986, federal researchers were not allowed to collaborate with the private sector (Congressional Research Service, 1991) . However, several pieces of legislation made important changes to the federal research paradigm, and as a consequence, affected other public research institutions, including universities (see Table 1 ).
Modification of US patent policy, as applied to publicly-funded research developments, provided new opportunities to protect intellectual property for research collaborators. While public institutions have had the right to patent for some time, previously the federal government assumed ownership of any inventions that resulted from research funded by federal funds. The Government Patent Policy of 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act) gave institutions 'certainty of title' for inventions resulting from federally-funded research and development. Consequently, universities and other cooperating research institutions that have used federal resources can now own the patents to any invention their researchers develop. The Bayh-Dole Act allowed federal laboratories to issue exclusive licenses to patents on its inventions. Previously, only non-exclusive or open licenses could be granted.
The Bayh-Dole Act had additional implications for agricultural research. The increased use of biotechnological techniques may have furthered the use of patents, because agricultural biotechnology innovations may be easier to shield using patents than traditional agricultural innovations. Therefore, these innovations can be more readily protected and capitalised (Postlewait et al., 1993) . Hybridisation refers to the process of crossing two unrelated inbred lines to create a seed variety with greater yield potential than either of the parental varieties. The adoption of hybrid crops had a dramatic impact on the development of new plant varieties, especially in the private sector. Hybrid crops provide an inherent form of intellectual property protection because the yield potential of progeny diminishes with each succeeding generation of seed. Another technological advancement, which spurred the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, was the development and introduction of high-yielding crop varieties, predominantly wheat and rice, in developing countries. These modern grain varieties were highly responsive to fertilisers and boosted world agricultural productivity.
More recently, scientific breakthroughs in the biological sciences have allowed scientists to make more precise changes at the molecular level, thereby expanding the opportunities to develop crops with desirable traits (Shoemaker et al., 2001 ). Modern biotechnology embodies a variety of techniques to achieve changes in plants, including cell culture and genetic engineering. Tissue cell culture helps to facilitate conventional plant breeding by reducing the time required to identify valuable traits. Genetic engineering is used to modify organisms by either enhancing or suppressing the performance of existing genes or transferring genetic information from one organism into a host organism. These gene transfer technologies enable researchers to tailor crops for specific uses, such as crops resistant to disease, pests, herbicides, or harsh environmental conditions, and crops with increased nutrition or improved food processing traits.
Biotechnology has blurred the distinction between basic and applied research and the respective roles of the public and private sectors. The private sector is conducting more research that would have been considered basic in the past, especially in genomics (i.e. the identification and mapping of genes, as well as determining gene function in living organisms). Some would argue, however, that private efforts in genomics have a more applied focus.
Biotechnology has made it more profitable for private industry to develop new crop varieties, expanding the production opportunities for farmers. Crops are being developed with improved production (input) or quality (output) traits. The first wave of new crop varieties available commercially was those with input traits, such as pest-or herbicide-resistant crops. Crops with these input traits offer certain farmers, who experience significant pest pressures, increased flexibility in managing pests. Also, farmers are able to use more effective herbicides and may reduce pesticide applications, thereby potentially increasing yields and reducing agricultural pesticide costs. The most common genetically modified crops available to farmers are herbicide-tolerant corn, cotton, and soybeans (mostly resistant to the glyphosate-based herbicide Roundup TM ), and Bt corn and cotton. Crops carrying herbicide-tolerant genes were developed to survive certain herbicides that previously would have destroyed the crop along with the targeted weeds, thus allowing farmers to use a broader variety of herbicides. Bt crops contain a gene from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis. Bt is toxic when ingested by certain 111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  1011  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  2011  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  30  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  40  1  2  3  4  5  6  711 insects. Crops expressing the Bt gene are able to produce this toxin, thereby providing protection throughout the entire plant.
New crop varieties with herbicide-tolerant and Bt traits are being adopted in the USA at an astonishing rate. Since commercial introduction of these varieties only a few years ago, adoption of corn varieties with these traits has increased dramatically from around 4% of planted corn acres in 1996 to around 45% in 2004. Likewise, the adoption of herbicide-tolerant and Bt cotton has increased from 17% of cotton acres to 76% during those years. Finally, adoption of herbicide-tolerant soybeans increased from 7% of soybean acres in 1996 to about 85% in 2004 (ERS, 2004a).
Role of strengthened intellectual property rights
To foster research and innovation, the Patent Act of 1790 established a system of property rights protection in the USA. However, the principal contribution of this patent act to agriculture was the protection offered for mechanical and chemical inventions. Biological inventions were considered products of nature and were not patentable. Therefore, appropriating the gains from technological advances in plant breeding was difficult. Simply possessing a biological invention provided the means to reproduce it. The development of hybrid seed technologies in the 1930s provided a form of natural intellectual property protection that required farmers to repurchase seed every year to maintain yields. 
Patents as a measure of technology transfer
Public sector institutions use a variety of mechanisms to transfer technology. Publications and networking among scientists are the primary means of open exchange. During the past century, USDA's Cooperative Extension Service has played a significant role transfering federal and university knowledge through its publications and direct advising of farmers. New mechanisms include licensing of patented innovations, CRADAs, and Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs). Each has its own role, but patenting of innovations offers a unique measure of scientific innovation and transfer. Public sector patenting is often used in the case of technologies that are intended for development by outside institutions (i.e. transferred). Patents are costly to obtain, so their use indicates that appropriability may be needed for tech transfer or that the innovation has the potential to enhance economic development or generate revenue. Defensive patenting is less likely to be done by universities and other public sector research institutions.
From 1976 to 2003, the number of patents issued to all federal agencies and laboratories remained essentially unchanged. At the same time, all patents granted grew at an average rate of 4.2% per year, and patents granted to US private firms increased at 4.1% per year. The most striking change was for US universities, for which issued patents increased at 11.4% annually, although university patenting appears to have levelled off since the late 1990s (Figure 2 ). Henderson and co-workers (1998) analysed this remarkable growth in general patenting by universities. Although the Bayh-Dole Act has played a role, the rate of university patenting began to accelerate before its passage, so it cannot have been the only causal factor. Other possible causes might include increases in university research funding, an increased attention to applied research, the growth of university technology transfer offices, and other changes in national intellectual property institutions, for example the expansion of patentable subject matter into areas such as genetically transformed organisms (Jaffe, 2000; Mowery et al., 2001) . Since passage of the Bayh-Dole Act probably played a role in the expansion of university technology transfer offices, it may have indirect as well as direct effects on the growth of university patenting.
These results apply to patents in all areas and not simply in agriculture or agricultural biotechnology. They are consistent with the view that although both the federal government and US universities use patents and licensing to reduce transaction costs in negotiating contracts during the process of technology transfer (Gallini, 2002) , universities may also see licensing as a source of revenue, while the federal government does not. Licensing revenue for universities has been about 3% of university research budgets in recent years (AUTM, 2004) , while for the federal government as a whole licensing revenue may be less than 0.1% of research budgets. The US Department of Agriculture's annual licensing revenue is only about 0.3% of its annual research budget (Heisey et al., 2006) . To better analyse and understand the economic effects of some of these trends, Economic Research Service (ERS) researchers and academic collaborators have assembled comprehensive data on agricultural biotech patents and other intellectual property. The Agricultural Biotechnology Intellectual Property (ABIP) database (ERS, 2004b) classifies a wide range of technologies used in agriculture, including innovations derived from plant molecular biology. The database also includes information on commercial ownership and public sector interest in several forms of intellectual property. Here we report preliminary and descriptive data from this database. In the database, agricultural biotechnology patents are grouped in two ways: by the type of institution (US or non-US firm, university, or government) to whom the patent is assigned, and by the technology type under which the patent is classified.
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The ABIP database was constructed to allow both broad and narrow definitions of agricultural and food biotechnology. Most generally, agricultural biotechnology is the use of organisms or parts of an organism to make or improve products or processes in agriculture. The domestication of plant species and selection of desired characteristics within agricultural species would qualify under this definition. More narrowly, what 'biotechnology' represents today is new knowledge about the natural processes of DNA replication, breakage, ligation, and repair that has made possible a deeper understanding of the mechanics of cell biology and the hereditary process itself (McCouch, 2001) . Although in agriculture the term 'biotechnology' has been most closely associated with genetic manipulation at the DNA level (genetic engineering), it may refer to a variety of techniques or products. These may include, for example, use of molecular markers in genetic improvement or more general use of genomic information. Similarly, the use of enzymes for fermentation in brewing or cheesemaking would be early examples of a broadly defined 'food biotechnology'. Genetically engineering yeast to modify or improve a baking process would be an example of a narrower or more recent definition of food biotechnology.
The ABIP database was constructed in an attempt to include patents in broadly defined agricultural and food biotechnology issued from 1976 through 2000. However, we also used the classification system in the ABIP data set to develop a smaller database of 'modern' agricultural biotechnology patents. These consisted of patents classified into the categories of genetic transformation, 'DNA-scale' biological processes, or genomics, and applied either to plants or animals, not including microorganisms. Figure 3 shows that the rate of growth in general agricultural biotechnology patents has been greater than the rate of growth in patenting in the entire economy, and the rate of growth in modern agricultural biotechnology patents has been even higher. In the early years of our sample, there was almost no patenting that could be considered 'modern' agricultural biotech. From 1980 to 1984, 'modern' agricultural biotechnology patents averaged about 3% of all agricultural biotechnology patents. By the 1996-2000 period, they averaged roughly 22% of all patents in agricultural biotech. Nonetheless, the rapid expansion of modern agricultural biotechnology patenting does not account for all the growth in total agricultural biotech patenting. Even when 'modern' agricultural biotechnology patents are extracted from the rest of the agricultural biotech sample, agricultural biotech patents still grew much more quickly than did total patents. Figure 4 breaks down the data on agricultural biotechnology patenting by sector over time. The entities with the largest numbers of agricultural biotechnology patents have been US firms, non-US firms, and US universities. Comparing Figures 4 and 2 indicates that US universities were assigned a far higher percentage of the patents in agricultural biotechnology than they were in all technological areas. Although in the final years of the series, agricultural biotechnology patenting by US universities fell off somewhat, over the entire time period US universities' rate of patenting in agricultural biotech increased even more quickly than did patenting by private firms. Figure 5 shows patent portfolios for all six kinds of institution across several notable technological categories. It should be borne in mind that these are percentages of all agricultural biotechnology patents issued to each type of institution between 1976 and 2000, and not absolute numbers of patents. Thus, they measure the relative propensity of each entity type to patent in a given technological area, and not the relative importance of a given institution to total patenting in any particular sub-technology. From 1976 to 2000, US firms were most likely to patent in modern agricultural biotechnology, followed by universities, both US and non-US (first column, Figure 5 ). On the other hand, the US government was least likely to patent in this area. In the case of general plant technology (including both 'modern' plant biotechnology and other plant-related technologies), all private firms, both US and non-U.S., were more likely to patent than were universities or governments (second column, Figure 5 ). The third column of Figure 5 looks at the overlap of these two technology types, namely the propensity to patent in 'modern' plant biotechnology -the technological category most associated with agricultural biotechnology in the popular conception. US firms were clearly more likely to patent in modern plant biotechnology than the other entity types, and the US government less likely to do so than the others.
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Patenting in a specific type of plant biotechnology -plant cultivars -is also of interest. US patents for cultivars are now issued whether or not they result from the use of some molecular technique such as gene insertion. Private firms almost completely dominate cultivar patenting, and, in fact, US private firms patent far more cultivars than do non-US firms ( Figure 6 ). Furthermore, two firms -Dupont/Pioneer and Monsanto, especially their subsidiaries acquired in recent years -dominate cultivar patenting. Two crops -corn and soybeans -also account for most of the US utility patents on plant cultivars.
Several other notable technological areas are depicted in Figure 5 . Non-US universities and the US federal government, followed by US universities, are relatively more likely to patent animal vaccines and veterinary pharmaceuticals (fourth column). Animal health research has been one of the most profitable biotechnology applications for the private sector (Department of Commerce, 2003) . Over the past 20 years, public sector research expenditures on animal disease prevention appear to have increased as a percentage of total public sector agricultural research, from about 6.5 to 9% (Current Research Information System -CRIS).
3 It is possible that this increased expenditure has been partially in response to greater opportunities to transfer veterinary pharmaceutical technologies to the private sector. The federal government clearly devotes a substantial proportion (a little over one-quarter) of its patenting in agricultural biotechnology to patents that concern biological control of pests and diseases for plants and animals (fifth column). No other type of institution devotes more than one-eighth of their patent portfolio to biological control. Finally, relatively few of the patents in the ABIP database relate to food or nutrition. However, non-US private firms and the US government patent relatively more in this area than do other institutions. 4 Thus, the pattern of agricultural biotechnology patenting clearly differs across sectors. As noted, US private firms, non-US private firms, and US universities dominate patenting in both general agricultural biotech and 'modern' agricultural biotech, which involves greater use of molecular level information. Furthermore, US firms take the lead over all other types of institutions not only in total numbers of agricultural biotechnology patents but also in portfolio concentration in modern agricultural biotech, modern plant biotech, plant cultivars, and general plant technology. Non-US firms in general have patent portfolios somewhat similar to US firms, but their portfolios are more diffuse and harder to characterise. Non-US firms also patent relatively more in food and nutrition related areas than all other types of institutions.
Universities -at first US universities, but in more recent years non-US universities as well -have increased their patenting in both general and modern agricultural biotech more rapidly than any other type of institution. The rapid growth in agricultural biotechnology patenting by US universities has occurred in tandem with the accelerated rate of patenting by these universities in all technological areas. In fact, US universities' patenting in agricultural biotech, as a percentage of all agricultural biotech patents, is much higher than US universities' percentage of all US utility patents. Clearly these universities are playing a major role in agricultural biotechnology, at least as indicated by patenting behaviour. In addition, Xia and Buccola (2005) identified scientific publications cited by agricultural biotechnology patents, and traced these citations to the universities that performed the research. They found that universities are a principal source for the science that led to agricultural biotechnology applications.
Across the technologies presented in Figure 5 , US universities' portfolios appear somewhat similar to US firms' portfolios in terms of distribution, but the frequencies of university patenting in each area are lower. Within their own portfolios, universities, both US and non-US, hold more patents in general plant technology than they do any other areas. However, universities are unique in that their patents appear to be spread more evenly across the set of technologies. In no area do universities account for the highest percentage of patents in a portfolio, nor do they account for the lowest per cent in any area. In both vaccines and veterinary pharmaceuticals, as well as in another technological area not reported in Figure 5 -general animal technologies -both US and non-US universities tend to patent relatively more frequently than do private firms. These figures suggest that the technologies transferred by universities via patenting are not concentrated within a single area (or areas). Rather, they cover a broad range of technologies.
It is possible that increased patenting by public sector institutions has been associated with a shift in public research towards technologies with greater private marketability. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess this hypothesis. Assessing the public goods components of patented technologies is difficult, as it requires case-by-case analysis and some subjective judgment. Furthermore, because of the likely private benefits provided by many patented technologies, other indicators such as research budgets might also be useful in determining possible shifts in public research priorities. The data used in Rubenstein (2003) demonstrate no discernible time trend in the proportion of USDA-granted licenses with public goods characteristics. With respect to research budgets, Day-Rubenstein and Fuglie (1999) found little evidence of major shifts in USDA's research priorities between 1984 and 1997, a period over which there were major changes in public sector technology transfer practice. Similar analysis that directly evaluates university research categories for their public goods components does not appear to be readily available.
Conclusions
Patent statistics may suggest other questions about agricultural biotechnology R&D, although they may not provide complete answers to these questions. The differences in patterns of patents granted suggest that not only differences in agricultural biotechnology research investment, but also differences in motivations for patenting, might explain patenting behaviour by firms, universities, and governments. Most studies of agricultural biotech patenting to date have addressed motivations for patenting by different types of institutions only obliquely, if at all, but the general literature does suggest some factors. Firms patent to protect their inventions, to develop strategic patent portfolios, and, perhaps in some cases to generate licensing revenue (Cohen et al., 2000; Jaffe, 2000) . Universities may patent as a means to transfer technology to the private sector for further development, to attempt to generate licensing revenue, or perhaps to contribute to regional economic development through spinoffs and science parks. These motivations for patenting by universities, in particular, are often merely stated in the literature rather than analysed in any detail. The US federal government, on the other hand, patents particularly as a means of technology transfer (Rubenstein, 2003; Jaffe and Lerner, 2001 Patent data might address other, but not all, questions concerning research, knowledge flows, and technology development in agricultural biotechnology. Knowledge about the patenting of research tools might help to understand the direction of knowledge flows as well as to assess the potential for research holdups. We performed an initial classification of the ABIP database into 'potential research tools'. As with modern biotechnology, US and non-US firms, as well as US universities and other non-profits did far more patenting in this area than did other institutions. However, the research tool classification at present is less robust than classification for some of the other categories, and so the results have not been reported in detail here. Furthermore, a deeper analysis of which patents are actually the key patents in a given technological area might prove extremely useful, particularly in the case of research tools.
US public sector institutions are using agricultural biotechnology patents in rather different ways to transfer technology. The federal government has not increased its patenting in this area at nearly the same rate as have US universities, and its patents on biological products or processes have tended to be outside modern biotechnology. Furthermore, even though the federal government has devoted a large proportion of its research budget over the years to plant-related research, a relatively small proportion of its patented technology is plant-related. These findings tend to confirm the view that the federal government patents technology it develops in areas where patenting is most likely to facilitate technology transfer, but that the patents held by the US government do not necessarily indicate research priorities.
The role of US universities is complex. Obviously they are important players in agricultural biotechnology in terms of patent counts, but, with some exceptions, their patent portfolio mimics the portfolio held by the private sector. Universities generally do not patent very near-market technologies such as plant cultivars, however. In this respect their patenting resembles that of the federal government. Future analysis might concentrate on determining university priorities in agricultural biotechnology and how they are set, and discovering more precisely defined areas in which university research in agricultural biotechnology differs from that of private firms. For example, university research could be more basic than research conducted by firms, in other words more related to general biology than to particular agricultural applications, as suggested by Xia and Buccola (2005) . Such a study, involving a more thorough investigation of university research priorities in agricultural biotechnology, would consider research investments, and other research outputs such as publications, in addition to patents.
